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Vandall: The American Law Institute is Dead in the Water

THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE IS DEAD IN
THE WATER*
FrankJ. Vandall**
When you watch a sailboat, often it will appear to stop or become
"dead in the water." Three common ways for this to happen are (1) the
wind stops blowing; (2) poor helmsmanship causes the boat to be
steered into the wind; or (3) the boat hits several large waves that bring
it to a stop. In my view, it appears as if The American Law Institute is
dead in the water.
The ALI has come to a stop in the water of persuasiveness because
it has hit four huge waves. The first wave was the requirement of a reasonable alternative design as a prerequisite to bringing a design defect
case.' The second wave was the exclusion of tobacco and handguns
from the design defects section.2 The third wave was the flawed definition of a defective drug,3 and the fourth wave was the Enterprise Responsibility Study of 1991.4
* All of my comments refer to The American Law Institute's role in producing the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability.
** Professor of Law, Emory University; B.A. 1964, Washington and Jefferson College; J.D.
1967, Vanderbilt University; LL.M. 1968, S.J.D. 1979, University of Wisconsin. I appreciate the
research assistance of Colin M. Bernardino. Mistakes, however, are mine.
1. See RESTATE~MELNT (THmD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b) (Proposed Final Draft 1997).
2. Section 2, comment d states:
[P]roducts such as ... tobacco[ ] [and] firearms ... may be found to be defective only
upon proof of the requisite conditions in Subsection (a), (b), or (c). If such products are
defectively manufactured or sold without reasonable warnings as to their danger when
such warnings are appropriate, or if reasonable alternative designs could have been
adopted, then liability under §§ I and 2 may attach. Absent proof of defect under those
Sections, however, courts have not imposed liability for categories of products that are
generally available and widely used and consumed, even if they pose substantial risks
of harm.
Id. § 2 cmt. d. The result is that the drafters have eliminated tobacco and handguns from the design
defects section. See Frank J. Vandal], The Restatement (Third) of Torts, Products Liability, Section
2(b): Design Defect, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 167, 193 (1995).
3. Section 6 provides in part:
(b) For purposes of liability under Subsection (a), a prescription drug or medical
device is defective if at the time of sale or other distribution the drug or medical device:
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THE REASONABLE ALTERNATIVE DESIGN REQUIREMENT

Contrary to the position taken by the ALI, the majority of courts

that have considered the question of reasonable alternative design do not
require it as a basis for proving strict liability. The reasonable alternative design requirement is supported by only three jurisdictions: Ala-

bama, Maine, and Michigan.
Section 2(b) of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability

reads like a wish list for manufacturing America It obliterates strict liability for defective products with four bold strokes. First, the Reporters
suggest that section 2(b) is merely a return to negligence. The comments to the Restatement state the following: "Subsections (b) and (c),
which impose liability for products that are defectively designed or sold
without adequate warnings or instructions and are thus not reasonably
safe, achieve the same general objectives as does liability predicated on
negligence."8
Section 2(b) is not a return to traditional negligence. It is a creation

of a novel cause of action-radical negligence-because it requires
proving a reasonable alternative design in almost every case. 9
(1) contains a manufacturing defect as defined in § 2(a); or
(2) is not reasonably safe due to defective design as defined in Subsection (c);
or
(3) is not reasonably safe due to inadequate instructions or warnings as defined
in Subsection (d).
(c) A prescription drug or medical device is not reasonably safe due to defective
design if the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the drug or medical device are sufficiently great in relation to its foreseeable therapeutic benefits that reasonable health
care providers, knowing of such foreseeable risks and therapeutic benefits, would not
prescribe the drug or medical device for any class of patients.
RESTATEMEI T (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIm. § 6(b) (Proposed Final Draft 1997).
4. The Reporters for this study proposed a test for design defects which would adopt a riskutility analysis whereby a design may be considered defective only when there was a "feasible
alternative design." 2 THE AM. LAW INST., REPORTERS' STuDY: ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR
PERSONAL INJURY 81 (1991) [hereinafter 2 ALl REPORTERS' STuDY]; see also Jerry J. Phillips,
Comments on the Reporters' Study of EnterpriseResponsibilityfor PersonalInjury, 30 SAN DIEGO
L. REv. 241,242 (1993).
5. See Frank J. Vandall, The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability Section 2(b):
The ReasonableAlternative Design Requirement, 61 TENN. L. REv. 1407, 1409 (1994).
6. See John F. Vargo, The Emperor's New Clothes: The American Law Institute Adorns a
"New Cloth" for Section 402A ProductsLiability Design Defects-A Survey of the States Reveals
a Different Weave, 26 U. MEM. L. REv. 493, 536 (1996).
7. See Frank J. Vandall, Constructing a Roof Before the FoundationIs Prepared:The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability Section 2(b) Design Defect, 30 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 261, 261 (1997).
8. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. a (Proposed Final Draft 1997).

9. "I call this standard 'radical negligence' because the plaintiff must prove more than negligence. He must prove that a reasonable alternative design... was available at the time of the sale
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Second, the Reporters sunk traditional strict liability by binding it
to manufacturing defects with the following language: "A product is deA product: (a)
fective when ... it contains a manufacturing defect ....
contains a manufacturing defect when the product departs from its intended design even though all possible care was exercised in the preparation and marketing of the product .... ""
Manufacturing defects are trivial because they are often easy to
prove and rarely occur." When a manufacturing defect occurs, such as
brake pads being left off a new car, the plaintiff's task is easy. He or she
merely shows that the brake pads were left off the car. Almost all of
these cases will be settled because the manufacturers do not want it
known that the new car left the plant without brake pads. These cases
are easy to prove under strict liability or negligence.
Third, the Reporters have all but erased traditional negligence from
the products liability lexicon. The Reporters accomplished this slight of
hand by saying:
The rules in this Section ...define the bases of tort liability for harm
caused by product defects ....Claims based on product defect ...
must meet the requisites set forth in Subsection (a), (b), or (c) ....As

long as these requisites are met, doctrinal tort categories such as negligence or strict liability may be utilized in bringing the claim.12
Clearly, the broad language of section 2(b) is intended to erase "oldfashioned" negligence. 3 "Early drafts of section 2(b) strongly implied
that the cause of action for traditional negligence had been eliminatedthat only4 section 2(b) was available as a cause of action for defective
design."'
With regard to the question of whether the common law action of
negligence would exist after the Restatement (Third), the Reporters
have presented a take it or leave it attitude. The open debate, present in
of the product." Vandall, supra note 7, at 266-67.
10. REsTATEMNr (THiRtD) OFTORTS: PRODS. LiAB. § 2 (Proposed Final Draft 1997).
11. For a discussion of the differences between manufacturing defect and design defect, see
Vandall, supranote 2, at 176-79.
12. RESTATEMENT (THD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. n (Proposed Final Draft 1997).
13. "'Old fashioned' negligence places on the plaintiff the burden of proving an absence of
due care, but does not require her to prove that a reasonable alternative design was available as a
condition precedent to suit." See Vandall, supra note 7, at 267 n.42. "'Old fashioned' negligence
is the cause of action we all studied in law school. It rests on the idea that a person may be negligent if he or she falls to exercise reasonable care." Id. at 262.
14. Id. at 267; see also RESTATEMENT (TrnD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. j (Tentative
Draft No. 1, 1994) ("The rules in this Section exclusively define the bases of tort liability for
harms caused by products defects....").
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the process of adopting past Restatements, has diminished in recent
times. Instead, the attitude of the Reporter seemed to be that we have
worked hard to write this document, and if you don't like it, it is up to
you to overturn it. The give-and-take that we saw in crafting the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A, for example, was missing.'
Fourth, the most important coup for the ALI was putting section
402A on the table for reconsideration in the first instance. There was no
reason to reconsider section 402A. It was adopted in almost every
state.'6 The decisions were sound and the results under section 402A
were good. The foundation of products liability theory had never been
challenged by the ALI. 7
HI.

THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY
EXCLUDES TOBACCO AND GuNs FROM ITS
DEFINITION OF DESIGN DEFECT

The second large wave that the ALI hit, which helped to stop its
forward progress, was the exclusion of tobacco and guns from the
definition of design defect in section 2(b). The $368.5 billion tobacco
settlement proposed in June 1997,1" suggests that the ALI is biased
against consumers in deleting tobacco and guns from section 2(b). The
ALI all but closed the door on defective design suits for tobacco and
handguns. Section 2(b) provides as follows: "[A product] is defective in
design when the foreseeable risks of harm ... could have been reduced
or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design.., and the
omission of the alternative design renders the product not reasonably
safe."' 19
At present, there is no alternative design for tobacco or handguns.
Under the Restatement (Third), therefore, neither can be defective. The
Reporters make the exclusion of tobacco and guns crystal clear in comment d when they say:
The requirement in Subsection (b) that plaintiff show a reasonable alternative design applies ... even though the plaintiff alleges that the
category of product sold ... is so dangerous that it should not have
15. There were at least three full institute discussions over a four-year period prior to the
adoption of section 402A. See Marshall S. Shapo, In Search of the Law of ProductsLiability: The
ALIRestatement Project,48 VAND. L. REv. 631, 690-91 (1995).
16. See id. at 637.

17. See Vandal], supranote 7, at 261-62.
18. See John M. Broder, Cigarette Makers in a $368 Billion Accord to Curb Lawsuits and
CurtailMarketing:Major Concessions, N.Y. TIMEs, June 21, 1997, at Al.
19. RESTATEmENT (THiRD) OFTORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b) (Proposed Final Draft 1997).
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been marketed at all. Common and widely distributed products such as
alcoholic beverages, tobacco, firearms and above-ground swimming
pools may be found to be defective only upon proof of the requisite
....
20
conditions in Subsection... (b)
Due to the lack of alternative designs for cigarettes and guns, the
ALI's exclusion has the effect of insulating the manufacturers from design defect suits. The ALI explains its position as follows: "[C]ourts
have concluded that legislatures and administrative agencies can, more
appropriately than courts, consider the desirability of commercial distribution of some categories of widely used and consumed, but nevertheless dangerous products."'" What the ALI fails to recognize is the subtle
and almost complete control that the tobacco manufacturers have over
Congress, which accounts for why the only meaningful challenge to the
tobacco industry came from the courts.' After the tobacco settlement,
individuals will be able to sue for their cancer and their addiction. However, it may be necessary for these individuals to be able to prove that
cigarettes are defective. If forced to sue solely under section 2(b) of the
Restatement (Third), individual smokers may lose because they cannot
prove a defect.
During the final minutes of the closing session of the ALI Annual
Meeting in 1997, the door was perhaps left open a crack to cigarette liability.2' Comment e states that a manufacturer of a toy gun that shoots
rubber pellets could be held liable for a defective design even though
there is no reasonable alternative design. 4 Comment d then stated that
this narrow exception did not apply to tobacco, alcohol, firearms, or
above-ground pools."5 A motion was made and passed that tobacco be
deleted from the list of exceptions to the toy gun example.26 This means
that it is now possible to argue that tobacco products are like a toy gun
20. Id. § 2 cmt. d (citation omitted).
21.

d

22. Tobacco companies are able to wield great control in Congress since they donate millions of dollars to Congressional candidates. See Don Van Natta, Jr., U.S. Subsidiariesof Foreign
Feb. 21, 1997, at A25 (giving an example of a
Companies Gave Heavily to G.O.P., N.Y. THAvsES,
donation by one tobacco company to the Republican party of over half a million dollars). The tobacco industry has also spent over $30 million in lobbying Congress this past year. See Maureen
Dowd, Integrity ClearanceSale, N.Y. TDMS, Dec. 20, 1997, at A13.
23. See Bruce Kaufman, ALI Membership GrantsFinal Approval to Influential ProductLi-

ability Treatise, BNA PROD. LIAB. DAILY, May 23, 1997, at D2. I thank Thomas Galligan at LSU
for bringing this point to my attention.
24. See RESTATATM&ENT (TmnD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LUA. § 2 cmt. e (Proposed Final Draft
1997).
25. See iL § 2 cmt d.
26. See Kaufman, supra note 23, at D2.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1998

5

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 3 [1998], Art. 12

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 26:801

that shoots rubber pellets. The manufacturer can be held liable for a defective design even though there is no reasonable alternative design for
the toy gun nor for tobacco.' However, this route is awfully circuitous,
and if comment e was intended to bring the boat around and allow a design defect suit against tobacco manufactures arguably that would have
been clearly stated.?5

Under section 402A of the Restatement (Second), it is certainly arguable that cigarettes spiked with nicotine are defective.29 This can also
be argued with regard to cigarettes that are designed to addict and cap-

ture young children as consumers.?
Similarly, the Reporters for the Restatement (Third) should have
kept the door open to liability against the manufacturer of handguns."
Professor Steven Shavell argues that the market can only work effectively when products are priced at their true social cost,32 meaning that
the price of each product should reflect the actual damage that it causes

to society. If we hold gun manufacturers liable, then the cost of the
product would include not merely raw materials, labor, and other

27. See Thomas C. Galligan, A Primer on Cigarette Litigation Under the Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability, 27 Sw. U. L. REv. 501,521 (forthcoming 1998).
28. See id, at 521; Ellen Wertheimer, Pandora'sHumidor: Tobacco Produces Liability in
Tort, 24 N. KY. L. 1,Ev. 397 (1997). For a discussion of generic liability, see generally Carl T.
Bogus, The Third Revolution in Products Liability, 72 CHI.-KENr L. REV. 3 (1996); Joseph A.
Page, Liabilityfor Unreasonably and Unavoidably Unsafe Products: Does Negligence Have a
Role to Play?, 72 C.-KENT L. REv. 87 (1996); Jerry J. Phillips, The Unreasonably Unsafe Product and Strict Liability,72 Ciln.-KENT L. REv. 129 (1996); Ellen Wertheimer, Unavoidably Unsafe
Products:A Modest Proposal,72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 189 (1996).
29. Smoking causes 350,000 deaths each year. See Frank J. Vandall, Reallocating the Costs
of Smoking: The Application of Absolute Liability to CigaretteManufacturers, 52 OHIo L.. 405,
405 (1991). Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that any product in a defective condition which is unreasonably dangerous to the user subjects the seller to liability. See
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTS § 402A(1) (1965). A product causing 350,000 deaths each
year to its users is certainly unreasonably dangerous to the user.
30. Cigarette advertisements, such as "Joe Camel," induce youngsters to start smoking,
rather than inducing smokers to switch brands. See Vandall, supra note 29, at 419 & n. 97. In fact,
R.L Reynolds Tobacco Company targeted teenage smokers in its ads. See Chris Bunitt, Publicity
PlaguesTobacco in Minnesota Suit, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Jan. 20, 1998, at Al.
31. See supra note 2.
32. For discussions of the differences in valuation of social cost using a negligence standard
and a strict liability standard, see A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Should Employees Be
Subject to Fines and Imprisonment Given the Existence of CorporateLiability?, 13 INT'L REV.
LAW & ECoN. 239 (1993); and Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1 (1980). Professor Shavell states that in ideal economic circumstances, "product prices will
tend to reflect the full social cost of production, inducing consumers to make socially correct purchase decisions." Steven Shavell, The Optimal Level of CorporateLiability Given the Limited
Ability of Corporationsto Penalize Their Employees, 17 INT'L REV. LAW & ECON. 203, 203
(1997).
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"inputs," but also the aggregate damage the product causes to society. If
we were to follow Professor Shavell's model, handguns would be priced
higher to reflect these externalities. If priced at their true social cost,
guns would be much more expensive, and far fewer would be purchased. Absent such attempts to internalize the social cost of guns, government agencies have resorted to alternate means to reduce the social
harm caused by gun use. For example, Boston has introduced a program
to reduce the number of handguns on the street, by seizing illegal guns."
Moreover, the case law with regard to handgun manufacturer liability is not, at present, encouraging. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in a Louisiana case brought by the mother of a pre-med student
who had been raped and then murdered with a handgun, denied the
plaintiffs claim of manufacturer liability. The court held that the plaintiff's absolute liability theory applied only to an ultrahazardous activity
related to land or other immovables and thus had no application to gun
marketing? 4 The court of appeals also held that the murderer was a superseding cause that cut off the liability of the gun manufacturer." In a
Maryland case involving the civil liability of a handgun manufacturer,
the court rejected the argument that the manufacturer could be held liable under either a strict liability or an ultrahazardous activity theory. 6
Nevertheless, a hopeful sign is represented by an ordinance adopted by
the city of Washington, D.C. The
ordinance holds manufacturers of
37
liable.
strictly
weapons
automatic
The argument for holding handgun manufacturers strictly liable is
simple: the cost of handguns exceeds their benefit, and therefore under
section 402A of the Restatement (Second), handguns should be considered defective and unreasonably dangerous." As a result, the manufacturers of handguns should be strictly liable for the tortious injuries that

33. Boston officials note that because of their program no Boston youth under the age of 17
has been killed by a gun since July 1995. See Mark Mueller, Hub's Gun-TracingInitiative Earns
PresidentialPraise,BOSTON HERALD, July 20, 1997, at 14.
34. See Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250, 1253, 1267-68 (5th Cir. 1985).
35. See id. at 167-68.
36. See Kelley v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 497 A.2d 1143, 1147-49 (Md. 1985).
37. The Act states:
Any manufacturer, importer, or dealer of an assault weapon ... shall be held strictly liable in tort, without regard to fault or proof of defect, for all direct and consequential
damages that arise from bodily injury or death if the bodily injury or death proximately
results from the discharge of the assault weapon... in the District of Columbia.
Assault Weapon Manufacturing Strict Liability Act of 1990, D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2392 (1995).
38. Since the costs of handguns outweigh the benefits of their use; they are unreasonably
dangerous, and therefore § 402A(l) provides that strict liability will apply against the manufacturers of handguns. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(l) (1965).
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handguns cause. As with the proposed tobacco settlement, the handgun
manufacturers should be held liable to the states for the costs of treating
all intentional and criminal gunshot injuries not involving self-defense. 9
If the costs of these damages were transferred from the states to the gun
manufacturers, the gun manufacturers would pass these costs on to the
consumers of guns. Consequently, the
prices of guns would rise and
4
fewer handguns would be purchased.
When guns are drawn in self-defense, the person usually shot is an
innocent victim rather than the attacker.4' More tragically, large numbers of children accidentally shoot themselves each year.42 What is becoming clear in our crowded, diverse, stress-filled, and often intoxicated
society is that handguns are defective, and that strict liability should be
the first step initiated in order to pass the extraordinary costs of these
defective products on to the manufacturers and consumers. The Reporters mistake was to prematurely close the door to handgun discourse and

liability. The debate on handgun liability, as with tobacco, rather than
being over, is just beginning.

3

III. THE ALI's DEFINITION OF A DEFECTIVE DRUG IS FLAWED
Section 6 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability is

titled "Liability of Seller or Other Distributor for Harm Caused by Defective Prescription Drugs and Medical Devices." The test for a defectively designed prescription drug is as follows:
A prescription drug or medical device is not reasonably safe due to defective design if the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the drug or
39. See Raymond E. Gangarosa et al., Suits by PublicHospitals to Recover Expendituresfor
the Treatment of Disease, Injury and Disability Caused by Tobacco and Alcohol, 22 FORDHIAM

URB. L.L 81, 85 (1994). The authors asserted that "an examination of the medical, social, historical, economic, and legal factors dictates that a cause of action against alcohol and tobacco manufacturers should be available to public hospitals to recover their expenditures for the uncompensated medical treatment that is necessitated by alcohol and tobacco abuse." Id.
40. See id. at 104-05 & n.118.
41. According to a 1986 study, guns are 43 times as likely to be accidentally used on someone known by the defender rather than an attacker. See Angela P. Swinson, Campaign for Gun
Trigger Locks Heating Up, PATRIOT-NEws (Harrisburg), Nov. 20, 1997, at B8.
42. The Centers for Disease Control found that approximately 800 children and teenagers
were unintentionally killed by people with firearms in 1994. Almost 200 of them were young children. See id. Gun accidents were the fifth leading cause of death for children under the age of 14 in
1991. See id.
43. The Mayor of Philadelphia is considering a suit against the gun manufacturers to recover
the costs of homicide unit overtime, the expense of counseling survivors of murder victims, and
other costs. See Craig R. McCoy & Clea Benson, PhiladelphiaPreparesSuit of Gun Industry,
ATLANTA J.-CONST., Jan. 10, 1998, at A5.
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medical device are sufficiently great in relation to its foreseeable
therapeutic benefits that reasonable health care providers, knowing of
not prescribe the
such foreseeable risks and therapeutic benefits, would
44
drug or medical device for any class of patients.
The Reporters do not cite any cases that adopt the test that they
suggest. 45 It is a flawed test for design defect because there will always
be some doctor who will prescribe the drug for a particular class of patients. This is because the drug manufacturers would not have produced
the drug and gone through the multi-million dollar test process if there
was not some market for the drug. The relevant question is not whether
there is a market for the drug; the question is whether the drug is defective."
Critics have been quick to attack the new test for design defects of
pharmaceuticals. Professor Teresa Schwartz critiques the Restatement
(Third) test for defectively designed drugs as follows:
The proposal for pharmaceutical liability ... is decidedly favorable
to defendants and is likely to reduce rather considerably the role of the
common law in assuring the safety of prescription products.
By adopting this heightened, super negligence standard, the drafters
aim to narrow considerably the category of prescription products that
can be found defective in design. Arguably it comes very close to
eliminating design claims altogether .... 47
Angela Rushton also makes clear the problems with the Restatement (Third):
The effect of the Draft is to not only radically alter the traditional
definition of "design defect" as used in strict liability cases, but also to
increase the plaintiff's burden with regard to the traditional negligence
standard. Such an overbearing standard is wholly unsupported by case
law and is problematic as a substantive rule of law. The broad standard
imposed by this section completely immunizes pharmaceutical manufacturers from claims brought under a design defect theory. As such,

44.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTORTS: PRODS. LL4B. § 6(c) (Proposed Final Draft 1997).

45. While the reporters' note lists a number of cases which apply strict liability for harm
caused by defectively designed prescription drugs or medical devices, none of them adopt the
specific test stated in section 6(c). See id. § 6 reporters' note, cmt. f.
46. There might be a market for Thalidomide, but that does not mean it is safe, i.e., not defective, when prescribed for pregnant women. See infra notes 71-73.
47. Teresa Moran Schwartz, PrescriptionProducts and the Proposed Restatement (Third),
61 TENN. L. REv. 1357, 1363, 1380 (1994) (citations omitted).
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this standard is likely to prove unworkable.48
What is perhaps of greatest concern is that the test for a defectively
designed drug reads as if it were written by a lobbyist for the pharmaceutical companies of America. Drug manufacturers surely have a right
to suggest their own test and to do so in a law review article, but49 such
partisan drafting is not what The American Law Institute is about.
Under the Restatement test, no drug manufacturer will likely ever
be liable for a design defect. The only basis left for suing the drug
manufacturers, except for a defective warning, is fraud. If the drug
manufacturers have put the drug on the market without adequate testing
or have fabricated results, they may be liable for fraud or misrepresentation.5
IV.

THE ENTERPRiSE RESPONSIBILITY STUDY

The document produced for the ALI known as the Compensation
and Liability for Product and Process Injuries ("Enterprise Responsibility Study") led to such an uproar and outpouring of discontent that the
ALI was forced to rethink the project.5' The first page of the Enterprise
Responsibility Study contains the following disclaimer:
This Reporters' Study is being circulated by the Council to the members of The American Law Institute for discussion at the Sixty-Eighth
Annual Meeting .... The Council has reviewed the material contained
herein, but its consideration of the material is not yet completed. As of
the date of its publication the views expressed in the Reporters' Study
have not been considered by the membership, and they therefore do
not represent the position of the Institute on any of the issues with
which the Reporters' Study deals.52
The Foreword to the Enterprise Responsibility Study provides:
48. Angela C. Rushton, Note, Design Defects Under the Restatement (Third) of Torts: A
Reassessment of StrictLiability and the Goals of a FunctionalApproach, 45 EMORY L.J. 389, 420

(1996).
49. The Institute should at the least restate the "majority" position. But even more than that,
the Restatement should seek to improve the law in a way which will fairly reflect conflicting interests. See Shapo, supra note 15, at 634. By catering solely to the interests of the drug companies,
the ALI has failed to produce a viable Restatement. The Restatement has forfeited "whatever claim
it may have to be an authoritative pronouncement." Id. at 654.
50. See Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 837 (2d Cir. 1967).
51. See THE AM. LAW INST., COMPENSAION AND LIABILITY FOR PROD. AND PROCESS

INJuRIEs (Council Draft No. 1, 1990); Vargo, supra note 6, at 509-15; see also Phillips, supranote
4, at 241 (mentioning the ALI project and the subsequent abandonment of that project).
52.

1 THE AM.

LAW INST., REPORTERS' STUDY: ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILrrY FOR PERSONAL

INJURY at i (1991) [hereinafter I ALI REPORTERS' STUDY].
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This two-volume Reporters' study is the product of the project formerly known as Compensation and Liability for Product and Process
Injuries. The Study addresses a complex array of legal problems in an
area of law that has been controversial in one way or another for at
least 50 years.
... [T]he Council has taken no position on the Study as a whole or
on particular proposals. 3

The text of the Council's resolution authorizing only publication and
circulation of the Reporters' study but not adoption sealed its demise:
RESOLVED, that the two-volume Report on Compensation and Liability for Product and Process Injuries (subject to such revisions as
the Reporters may make) be published as a Reporters' Study, be made
available for public distribution, and be brought before the membership of the Institute for discussion in May, 1991, with a view to no ac....
tion being taken by the membership at such meeting
The reason for the failure of the Enterprise Responsibility Study is
that it represented almost pure economic theory and was felt to have
very little to do with products liability case law.5" It was simply not a
Restatement.56
Indeed, the Enterprise Responsibility Study seemed to have its own
agenda, independent of simply restating the case law:
Tort liability is particularly effective in dealing with emerging hazards
that can be treated within the context of particular cases. Idiosyncratic
risks are also likely to be better handled by tort adjudication than by
broadly designed government regulations.
Of the other settings, regulatory agencies seem best equipped to
establish the appropriate prevention incentives, for they are able to select the level of penal stringency that appears most appropriate. In
contrast, tort incentives are a function of the compensation paid to victims, posing the difficult problem of how to avoid distorting the judg-

53. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Forewordto 1 ALI REPORTERS' STUDY, supranote 52, at xi-xii.
54. Id. at xii.
55. See Stephen D. Sugarman, A Restatement of Torts, 44 STAN. L. REv. 1163, 1164-65,
1167 (1992).
56. The Restatement of Torts provides:
The object of the Institute in preparing the Restatement is to present an orderly
statement of the general common law of the United States, including in that term not
only the law developed solely by judicial decision, but also the law that has grown from
the application by the courts of statutes that have been generally enacted and have been
in force for many years.
Introductionto RESTATEMENT OF TORTS at viii-ix (1934).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1998

11

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 3 [1998], Art. 12
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:801

ment about what level of compensation should be required to provide
sufficient incentives for safety.5
The Enterprise Responsibility Study was issued as a Reporters'
Study and not as a traditional Restatement. It did, however, function as
an early warning. This red flag suggested that the ALI had tacked and
was changing course. In hindsight, it is clear that the Enterprise Responsibility Study was a chart for the ALI's new tack that was to follow
in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability."
V.

CONCEALED AUTHORITY: THE CASE OF THE MISSING CITATIONS

In reading the Restatement (Third), one is able to look inside the
analytical framework and see pure market economics rather than law.
For example, in explaining section 2(b), the Reporters state an obviously silly example: "Society does not benefit from products that are
excessively safe-for example, automobiles designed with a maximum
speed of 20 miles per hour ....
One might ask, "What are examples of excessively safe products?
What are the Reporters talking about?" Perhaps they are thinking about
the Volvo, a car that has always been marketed with safety as a primary
concern, but we see that the law has not forced Volvo to make an excessively safe car. Instead, Volvo has decided to create a market niche
for itself by suggesting that its cars are safer than others. This has
proven to be a good strategy for a car that historically has fallen short
with regard to such typical consumer attractions as ride, style, acceleration, and refinement.'
Perhaps the Reporters are referring to the alleged demise of the
general aircraft industry. This is a refrain that is often heard-that prod-

57. 1 ALI REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 52, at 256. Chief Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson
has noted the foundering of the ALI with regard to the Enterprise Responsibility Study:
"[W]hether the individual members of the ALI can indeed remain objective [in voting on adoption
of such projects] is open to question.... mhe increasing influence of the Institute and the controversial nature of its projects serve to compound the problem." Shirley S. Abrahamson, Refreshing
InstitutionalMemories: Wisconsin and The American Law Institute: The FairchildLecture, 1995

WIs. L. Rnv. 1,24.
58. Volume II of the Enterprise Responsibility Study critiques the state of the law regarding
manufacturing defects, design defects, warning defects, and cause in fact. See 2 ALI REPORTERS'
STUDY, supranote 4, at 33-82, 319-51 (1991).
59. RESTATEMENT (THiR) OFTORTS: PRODS. LeAB. § 2 cmt. a (Proposed Final Draft 1997).
The Reporters do not provide a footnote for their "excessively safe" theory.
60. Consumer Reports called the Volvo 960 "boxy" and "cumbersome," but praised its
safety features. See Road Test, CONSuMER REP., Aug. 1992, at 511-12.
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ucts liability suits caused the death of the general aircraft industry,6 but
that argument reflects superficial analysis. The restructuring of the general aircraft industry can be explained in a much more fundamental
way.62 Why should anyone buy a new airplane? Every FAA-certified
airplane is at all times in superb condition and capable of flying at a
moment's notice. Why? Because the FAA requires it.63 If a part is worn
or frayed, the FAA requires that it be replaced. 64 Some parts (engines)
are rebuilt on an hourly basis. 6 The result is that every general aviation
aircraft is almost as good as a new plane. Where airplane safety falls
short, however, is in electronics, which can often be upgraded at a
nominal cost. 6 What stringent regulation by the FAA has done is to require owners to continually maintain their planes. Why would someone
buy a new plane, for example, when the plane he or she has is just as
good in every way as the plane that he or she was going to buy? Rather
than it being a function of too much safety putting the general aircraft
industry out of business, it is a function of appropriate safety. Certainly
no one would suggest-and the Reporters have not-that we should allow uncertified general aircraft to fly.
Perhaps the Reporters, in using the words "excessively safe," are
referring to pharmaceuticals. Perhaps they are dredging up the argument
that strict liability has forced too much testing by pharmaceutical companies, and therefore we do not have a broad enough range of prescription drugs.' This argument is also flawed. The Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") has, for example, initiated a fast track for the treatment

61. See John H. Boswell & George Andrew Coats, Saving the General Aviation Industry:
Putting Tort Reform to the Test, 60 J. AiR L. & Com. 533, 547-49 (1994-1995) (claiming that the
general aviation industry was "on the verge of death," and that manufacturers such as Cessna and
Piper had either stopped making single-piston engine aircraft or were declaring bankruptcy due to

lawsuits).
62. Other causes besides litigation have been blamed for the decline in the general aviation
industry including the Gulf War, mismanagement, fuel prices, and the elimination of the investment tax credit. See Ladd Sanger, Will the GeneralAviation Revitalization Act of 1994 Allow the
Industry to Fly High Once Again?, 20 OKLA. Crry U. L. REV. 435, 442 (1995).
63. "[Ain aircraft may not fly without receiving a certificate of airworthiness from (the
FAA]." Ashley W. Warren, Compliancewith Governmental Regulatory Standards:Is It Enough to
hnmunize a Defendantfrom Tort Liability?,49 BAYLoR L. REv. 763,783 (1997).
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See generally Beech UpgradesArmy RC-12NS, DEF. & AERO. ELEC., May 17, 1993, at

7.
67. See Yvonne M. Driessen, Note, PRODUCTS LIABILITY-A Case-by-Case Approach to
DeterminingStrict Liability in PrescriptionDrug Cases-Hahnv. Richter, 628 A.2d 860 (Pa,Super. Ct. 1993), appeal docketed, No. 32 E.D. Appeal Docket (Pa.Apr. 25, 1994), 67 TaIP. L. REV.
883, 897 (1994).
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of AIDS6 and has been somewhat successful. Many people who had

tested positive for AIDS are now testing clear of the disease.6"
Indeed, the drug that led to the FDA's very cautious and thorough
approach is Thalidomide. 70 It was sold in England and Germany and led

to numerous children being born with missing and deformed limbs.7'
Today, however, Thalidomide is being sold in the United States for the
treatment of AIDS. 2 Thalidomide decreases the physical debilitation of

AIDS patients." If products liability law had created an excessively safe
environment for drugs, we would certainly not have a fast track for
AIDS drugs. Nor would we have one of the most dangerous prescription
drugs ever marketed now being sold in the United States. Because there
are no citations for the term "excessively safe" in the Restatement
(Third), the term may very well be the academic equivalent of "the sky
is falling."
VI.

CONCLUSION

The ALl can print anything it wants. First-year law students are
taught that Restatements are secondary authority and persuasive only. 74
The change is that now the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability is less persuasive than in the past.7 The Restatement (Third) is
more like a trade journal, and the new perspective of the ALI is clear on

its face.
68. See Jerry Gray, House Approves Bill to Speed Review of Medicines, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8,
1997, at A16 (stating that both the House of Representatives and the Senate have passed bills allowing for speedier FDA approval of AIDS treatments). *
69. See Lawrence K. Altman, Powerful Response Reported in a Combined AIDS Therapy,
N.Y. TiMFs, July 11, 1996, at A16 (discussing how the taking of "drug cocktails," containing a
new type of drug called a protease inhibitor, causes the virus level in many patients to drop below
detectable levels).
70. See Sabra Chartrand, DrgMakers Test Thalidomide as a Treatmentfor Inflammations
That Accompany Serious Diseases, N.Y. TImEs, Feb. 24, 1997, at D2 (discussing how the disastrous effects of Thalidomide use in Europe in the 1950s provoked the FDA to enact sweeping drug
testing reforms which are reflected in today's strict testing standards).
71. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Weighing Hope Against Horror,N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1997, at
D1; see also Chartrand, supra note 70, at D2 (stating that between 2,000 and 3,000 children were
born in Europe with serious defects due to Thalidomide).
72. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Thalidomide, Once Banned, Is in Demand, N.Y. TIM7ES, Nov.
28, 1997, at Al.
73. Clinical studies have shown that Thalidomide can combat mouth ulcers and weight loss
in AIDS patients. See id.; Chartrand, supra note 70, at D2.
74. See Shapo, supra note 15, at 682, 685. Restatements simply tell what the law in a general area is and what it should change to. See BLACK'S LAw DICTmONARY 1313 (6th ed. 1990).
75. Rather than restating the law, the Restatement (Third) provides a manufacturer friendly
set of rules which leave them free from liability in a large number of situations. This increases
profits. See, e.g., supranotes 49 and 50 and accompanying text.
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The ALI made a $368.5 billion mistake with regard to tobacco.
One would think that such an enormous error would cause the ALI to
pause (or tack for a better breeze).
Why the Restatement (Third) reads the way it does becomes more
clear when we list those manufacturers who directly benefit from the
new proposals: tobacco, alcohol, handguns, above-ground pools, prescription drugs, and all manufacturers who are routinely sued for
amounts less than $100,000.16 Honda has been very successful with their
automobiles by changing models every five years. Perhaps the winds of
support and encouragement would again blow favorably upon the ALI if
they followed Honda's lead and began work on a new draft of section
2(b). "The Restatement... has become out of date."77
The task facing the ALI is how to refill its sails, how to get the boat
moving again. To maintain its neutrality and effectiveness, the ALI
must ask how it might return to its mission of restating the common
law 78 and avoid becoming merely another conservative voice for tort reform. Otherwise it is likely to remain dead in the water.

76. Expert witnesses, which would be required to provide alternate designs in product liability cases, often cost up to $40,000. See Stanczyk v. Black & Decker, Inc., 836 F. Supp. 565, 568
(N.D. 111.1993) (estimating expert fees to cost between $20,000 and $40,000); Jochims v. Isuzu
Motors, Inc., 141 F.R.D. 493, 494, 497 (S.D. Iowa 1992) (finding fees of $150 to $250 per hour
and total costs exceeding $40,000).
77. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTORTS: PRODS. LLAB. § 1 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1994). This
statement is the sum of the Al Director's evaluation of section 402A of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts.
(1934).
78. See Introduction to RESTATEMEN oFTORTS at viii-ix
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